Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/179076 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2016
Citation: 
[Journal:] Agricultural and Food Economics [ISSN:] 2193-7532 [Volume:] 4 [Issue:] 14 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Heidelberg [Year:] 2016 [Pages:] 1-18
Publisher: 
Springer, Heidelberg
Abstract: 
The information asymmetries inherent in credence goods have typically led economists to conclude these markets require well-defined quality standards and third-party verification that producers are meeting those standards. Nonetheless, many producers of credence goods appear to be opting out of certification. Why? This paper builds in previous research and develops a theoretical framework to think about how producers' motivation and relationships with consumers affect the necessity and effectiveness of certification. I find the degree to which a consumer trusts the producer of a credence good and the certification standard that governs it and the degree to which the producer is motivated to produce a good of a certain quality both have important effects on certification-based regulation.
Subjects: 
Credence goods
Organic food
Certification
Agriculture
Trust
Intrinsic motivation
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Article

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