Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/177596
Authors: 
Lambertini, Luca
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 1096
Abstract: 
A well established dynamic model describing the impact of oligopolistic interaction on a renewable resource is revisited here to illustrate its dual interpretation as a waste removal differential game. The regulatory implications are illustrated by assuming that the public agency may control market price and possibly also access to the commons. Two different formulations of the managerial or CSR objective are envisaged, based on a combination of profits and either output or the individual share of the waste stock. It is shown that if the representative firm's objective includes the residual waste stock, there exists a unique regulated price driving to zero the steady state stock itself. Hence, the present analysis delivers some useful indications concerning an appropriate definition of the CSR objective firms should adopt.
Subjects: 
waste removal
resource extraction
feedback information
regulation
tragedy of commons
JEL: 
C73
L13
Q20
Q53
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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