Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/176962
Autoren: 
Danziger, Eliav
Danziger, Leif
Datum: 
2018
Reihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper 6943
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyzes the effects of introducing a graduated minimum wage in a model with optimal income taxation in which a government seeks to maximize social welfare. It shows that the optimal graduated minimum wage increases social welfare by increasing the low-productivity workers’ consumption and bringing it closer to the first-best. The paper also describes how the graduated minimum wage in a social welfare optimum depends on important economy characteristics such as the government’s revenue needs, the social-welfare weight of low-productivity workers, and the numbers and productivities of the different types of workers.
Schlagwörter: 
graduated minimum wage
optimal income taxation
social welfare
JEL: 
D60
H21
J30
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
242.72 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.