Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/174924
Autoren: 
Cagala, Tobias
Glogowsky, Ulrich
Grimm, Veronika
Rincke, Johannes
Datum: 
2017
Reihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper 6801
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper studies public goods provision in an experiment in which contributors repeatedly interact with rent-extracting administrators. Our main result is that the presence of an administrator reduces contributions but only because rent extraction lowers the MPCR. Analysing the dynamic interactions between the contributors and the administrator, we demonstrate that rent-extraction and cooperation shocks trigger short-run adjustments in the agents’ behaviour. However, shocks do not have permanent effects. This explains the long-run resilience of cooperation to rent extraction. We also show that cooperative attitudes and trust are traits that explain permanent differences in the short-run volatility of public goods provision.
Schlagwörter: 
cooperation
rent extraction
corruption
trustworthiness
public goods
public trust game
panel vector autoregressive model
JEL: 
C32
C91
C92
H41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
596.12 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.