Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/174424
Authors: 
Lombardi, Michele
Yoshihara, Naoki
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper 2017-15
Abstract: 
A partially-honest individual is a person who follows the maxim, "Do not lie if you do not have to" to serve your material interest. By assuming that the mechanism designer knows that there is at least one partially-honest individual in a society of n Ï 3 individuals, a social choice rule (SCR) that can be Nash implemented is termed partially-honestly Nash implementable. The paper o§ers a complete characterization of the n-person SCRs that are partially-honestly Nash implementable. It establishes a condition which is both necessary and su¢cient for the partially-honest Nash implementation. If all individuals are partially-honest, then all SCRs that satisfy the property of unanimity are partially-honestly Nash implementable. The partially-honest Nash implementation of SCRs is examined in a variety of environments.
Subjects: 
Nash implementation
pure strategy Nash equilibrium
partial-honesty
Condition &#x03bc
*
JEL: 
C72
D71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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