Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/174424 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2017-15
Verlag: 
University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics, Amherst, MA
Zusammenfassung: 
A partially-honest individual is a person who follows the maxim, "Do not lie if you do not have to" to serve your material interest. By assuming that the mechanism designer knows that there is at least one partially-honest individual in a society of n Ï 3 individuals, a social choice rule (SCR) that can be Nash implemented is termed partially-honestly Nash implementable. The paper o§ers a complete characterization of the n-person SCRs that are partially-honestly Nash implementable. It establishes a condition which is both necessary and su¢cient for the partially-honest Nash implementation. If all individuals are partially-honest, then all SCRs that satisfy the property of unanimity are partially-honestly Nash implementable. The partially-honest Nash implementation of SCRs is examined in a variety of environments.
Schlagwörter: 
Nash implementation
pure strategy Nash equilibrium
partial-honesty
Condition μ∗
JEL: 
C72
D71
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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