Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/174402
Authors: 
Ju, Biung-Ghi
Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper 2016-10
Abstract: 
We model problems of allocating disputed properties as generalized exchange economies. Therein, agents have preferences and claims over multiple goods, and the social endowment of each good may not be sufficient to satisfy all individual claims. We focus on market-based allocation rules that impose a two-step procedure: assignment of rights based on claims first, and voluntary exchange based on the assigned rights afterwards. We characterize three focal egalitarian rights-assignment rules that guarantee that the allocation rules are fair. We apply our results to problems of greenhouse gas emissions and contested water rights.
Subjects: 
fairness
claims
no-envy
individual rationality
egalitarianism
efficiency
Walrasian exchange
JEL: 
D63
D71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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