Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/173477
Authors: 
Bibow, Jörg
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Levy Economics Institute 868
Abstract: 
This paper investigates the European Central Bank's (ECB) monetary policies. It identifies an antigrowth bias in the bank's monetary policy approach: the ECB is quick to hike, but slow to ease. Similarly, while other players and institutional deficiencies share responsibility for the euro's failure, the bank has generally done "too little, too late" with regard to managing the euro crisis, preventing protracted stagnation, and containing deflation threats. The bank remains attached to the euro area's official competitive wage-repression strategy, which is in conflict with the ECB's price stability mandate and undermines its more recent, unconventional monetary policy initiatives designed to restore price stability. The ECB needs a "Euro Treasury" partner to overcome the euro regime's most serious flaw: the divorce between central bank and treasury institutions.
Subjects: 
Central Banking
Monetary Policy
Euro Crisis
Lender of Last Resort
Euro Treasury
JEL: 
E30
E42
E52
E58
E61
E65
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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