Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/173093
Autoren: 
Asatryan, Zareh
Castellón, Cesar
Stratmann, Thomas
Datum: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 16-034
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper studies the long-run fiscal consequences of balanced budget rules (BBR) that are enshrined in a country's constitution. Using historical data dating back to the 19th century and applying a difference-in-difference approach we find that the introduction of a constitutional-BBR reduces government debt-to-GDP and expenditure-to-GDP ratios, on average, by around 11 and 3 percentage points, respectively. We do not find evidence that BBRs affect tax revenues. Our analysis indicates that such rules reduce the probability of experiencing a debt crisis and that the effective enforcement of BBRs can be conditional on the quality of democratic institutions. In addition, we implement an instrumental variable approach by instrumenting the probability of having budget rules on de jure constraints on changing the constitution. This and other tests suggest that the relations we find are largely causal going from BBRs to fiscal outcomes.
Schlagwörter: 
economic effects of constitutions
fiscal rules
historical public finances
sovereign debt crises
JEL: 
H60
K10
N40
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
4.08 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.