Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/172533
Authors: 
Schultefrankenfeld, Guido
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Bundesbank Discussion Paper 39/2017
Abstract: 
I assess how dissenting views on appropriate monetary policy result in disagreement about the macroeconomic outlook of Federal Open Market Committee members. FOMC members that voted for a higher Fed Funds Rate than the majority of voters also forecast higher inflation rates, while they forecast lower unemployment rates relative to the consensus view on the future economy. Voters that tighten their stance revise inflation forecasts to the upside and unemployment forecasts to the downside. Members that switched their voting status between forecasting rounds, i.e., switched from voting with the majority to being a dissenting minority voter, or switched vice versa, are significantly more hesitant in revising their macroeconomic forecasts.
Subjects: 
Federal Reserve System
Federal Open Market Committee
Federal Funds Rate
Dissent
Forecast Disagreement
JEL: 
C12
E52
ISBN: 
978-3-95729-421-0
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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