Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/171691
Authors: 
Britz, Volker
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Economics Working Paper Series 16/248
Abstract: 
In non-cooperative bargaining games in the tradition of Rubinstein, the proposer derives bargaining power from the prospect of a costly delay which would follow the rejection of a proposal. We consider a unanimity bargaining game in which the proposer can strategically choose to prolong this delay. Prolonging the delay increases the proposer's bargaining power, but is assumed to come at a cost and thus cause an inefficiency. We use an appropriate refinement of stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium as the solution concept. We characterize equilibrium strategies and payoffs. We establish conditions on model parameters under which equilibrium is or is not efficient. For inefficient equilibria, we quantify the extent of the inefficiency. Moreover, we study the relation between the number of players and the degree of inefficiency. We find that inefficient equilibria become more inefficient the more players there are. Moreover, the parameter region in which an efficient equilibrium is possible shrinks when the number of players increases.
Subjects: 
Bargaining
Surplus Destruction
Discount Factor
Timing
JEL: 
C72
C78
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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