Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/171124
Authors: 
Guven, Gokhan
Inci, Eren
Russo, Antonio
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 6660
Abstract: 
We study a platform’s design of membership and transaction fees when sellers compete and buyers cannot observe the prices and features of goods without incurring search costs. The platform alleviates sellers’ competition by charging them transaction fees that increase with sales revenue, and extracts surplus via membership fees. It prices consumers’ membership below its cost to encourage their search. Examples include malls and online marketplaces. Most malls do not charge for parking while most lease contracts include percentage rents as well as fixed rents. Online marketplaces charge sellers for membership and per transaction while letting consumers access website for free.
Subjects: 
consumer search
membership fees
retail agglomeration
transaction fees
two-sided platforms
JEL: 
D21
D40
D83
L13
R33
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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