Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/170961 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 10977
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
We revisit the incentive effects of elimination tournaments with a fresh approach to identification, the results of which strongly support that performance improves under the threat of elimination and does so, but only in part, due to increases in risk taking. Where we can separately identify changes in risk-independent performance and risk taking, our estimates suggest that 23 percent of the improvement in performance induced by potential elimination is due to productive increases in risk taking. These effects are concentrated among those closest to the margin of elimination and among lower-ability competitors.
Subjects: 
tournament
contract
risk
sports
JEL: 
I21
L83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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