Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/170961 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 10977
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We revisit the incentive effects of elimination tournaments with a fresh approach to identification, the results of which strongly support that performance improves under the threat of elimination and does so, but only in part, due to increases in risk taking. Where we can separately identify changes in risk-independent performance and risk taking, our estimates suggest that 23 percent of the improvement in performance induced by potential elimination is due to productive increases in risk taking. These effects are concentrated among those closest to the margin of elimination and among lower-ability competitors.
Schlagwörter: 
tournament
contract
risk
sports
JEL: 
I21
L83
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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