Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/168142
Authors: 
Baumann, Florian
Rasch, Alexander
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Marketing G12-V2
Abstract: 
We consider a situation of duopolistic competition in which one firm may (falsely) advertise high product quality. Consumers are heterogeneous. One group forms rational beliefs about quality, whereas some consumers are naive and fully trust any advertisement. We compare two scenarios in which either the competitor or a government agency can file an injunction suit. From a welfare perspective, we show that it may be optimal either to have the competitor or the government agency as plaintiff.
JEL: 
K41
K42
L13
L15
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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