Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/167933
Authors: 
Giménez-Gómez, José-Manuel
Osório, António
Peris, Josep E.
Year of Publication: 
2015
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 6 [Year:] 2015 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 32-38
Abstract: 
Agents involved in a conflicting claims problem may be concerned with the proportion of their claims that is satisfied, or with the total amount they get. In order to relate both perspectives, we associate to each conflicting claims problem a bargaining-in-proportions set. Then, we obtain a correspondence between classical bargaining solutions and usual claims rules. In particular, we show that the constrained equal losses, the truncated constrained equal losses and the contested garment (Babylonian Talmud) rules can be obtained throughout the Nash bargaining solution.
Subjects: 
bargaining problem
conflicting claims problem
proportionality
bargaining solutions
claims rules
JEL: 
C71
D63
D71
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article
Appears in Collections:

Files in This Item:
File
Size
279.53 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.