Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/167931
Authors: 
Cartwright, Edward J.
Lovett, Denise
Year of Publication: 
2014
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 5 [Year:] 2014 [Issue:] 4 [Pages:] 234-256
Abstract: 
We investigate experimentally whether the extent of conditional cooperation in public good games depends on the marginal per capita return (MPCR) to the public good and type of game. The MPCR is varied from 0.2 to 0.4 to 0.8. The "standard" game, in which three players contribute before a follower, is compared with a leader-follower game, in which one player leads and three follow. Even though we observe less conditional cooperation for an MPCR of 0.2, the prevalence of conditional cooperation remains relatively stable to changes in the MPCR and game timing. In contrast, the level of MPCR has a strong effect on unconditional contributions. Our results highlight the critical role played by leaders in a public good game.
Subjects: 
public good
conditional cooperation
reciprocity
leadership
JEL: 
C72
H41
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article
Appears in Collections:

Files in This Item:
File
Size
318.29 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.