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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 5 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2014 [Pages:] 234-256
Verlag: 
MDPI, Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
We investigate experimentally whether the extent of conditional cooperation in public good games depends on the marginal per capita return (MPCR) to the public good and type of game. The MPCR is varied from 0.2 to 0.4 to 0.8. The "standard" game, in which three players contribute before a follower, is compared with a leader-follower game, in which one player leads and three follow. Even though we observe less conditional cooperation for an MPCR of 0.2, the prevalence of conditional cooperation remains relatively stable to changes in the MPCR and game timing. In contrast, the level of MPCR has a strong effect on unconditional contributions. Our results highlight the critical role played by leaders in a public good game.
Schlagwörter: 
public good
conditional cooperation
reciprocity
leadership
JEL: 
C72
H41
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