Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/161499
Authors: 
Yogo, Urbain Thierry
Njib, Martine M. Ngo
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
WIDER Working Paper 2016/116
Abstract: 
Building on the literature of the political economy of taxation, this article explores the relationship between political competition and tax revenues using a sample of 89 developing countries from 1988 to 2010. Owing to the inertia of tax variables, we estimate a dynamic panel data model using the Blundell and Bond two-step System-GMM. The analysis led to the following results: political competition positively and significantly affects total tax revenues; however, this general pattern differs slightly across the type of taxes; and the net effect of political competition on tax revenues is negative for countries which have adopted fiscal rules.
Subjects: 
level of tax revenues
political competition
volatility of tax revenues
JEL: 
C72
D72
H21
ISBN: 
978-92-9256-160-4
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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