Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159923
Authors: 
Roberti, Paolo
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 1085
Abstract: 
This paper analyses a model of electoral competition with lobbying, where candidates hold private information about their willingness to pander to lobbies, if elected. I show that this uncertainty induces risk-averse voters to choose candidates who implement policies biased in favor of the lobby. Increasing the prior probability of non-pandering candidates can increase the effect of lobbying. If, however, the cost of running for office is sufficiently large, there is no effect of lobbying on policy. The model thus demonstrates that uncertainty on the influence of special interests can lead to large effects of lobbying on policy.
JEL: 
D72
D74
D78
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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