Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159902
Authors: 
Lambertini, Luca
Marattin, Luigi
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 1064
Abstract: 
We revisit the discussion about the relationship between price's cyclical features, implicit collusion and the demand level in an oligopoly supergame where a positive shock may hit demand and disrupt collusion. The novel feature of our model consists in characterising the post-shock noncooperative price and comparing it against the cartel price played in the last period of the collusive path, to single out the conditions for procyclicality to arise both in the short and in the long-run.
JEL: 
C73
E60
L13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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