Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159841
Authors: 
Delbono, Flavio
Lambertini, Luca
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 1003
Abstract: 
This paper aims at participating in the long-lasting debate about the analytical foundations of the Cournot equilibrium. In a homogeneous oligopoly, under standard regularity conditions, we prove that Cournot-Nash emerges both under (i) price competition and Cournot conjectures; and (ii) supply function competition with ex post market clearing. We demonstrate both results within a model of exogenous product differentiation.
JEL: 
D43
L13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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