Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159798
Authors: 
Lambertini, Luca
Palestini, Arsen
Tampieri, Alessandro
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 959
Abstract: 
We investigate a linear state dfferential game describing an asymmetric Cournot duopoly with capacity accumulation à la Ramsey and a negative environmental externality (pollution), in which one of the firms has adopted corporate social responsibility (CSR) in its statute, and therefore includes consumer surplus and the environmental effects of production in its objective function. If the market is sufficiently large, the CSR firm sells more, accumulates more capital and earns higher profits than its profit-seeking rival.
JEL: 
C73
H23
L13
O31
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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