Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159797
Authors: 
Lambertini, Luca
Pignataro, Giuseppe
Tampieri, Alessandro
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 958
Abstract: 
In this paper we analyse a setup where consumers are heterogeneous in the perception of environmental quality. The equilibrium is verified in a setting with horizontal and vertical (green) differentiation. Profits are increasing in the misperception of quality, while, the investment in green quality decreases the more the goods are substitutes. We further consider the introduction of either an emission tax or an environmental standard. The former rises the investment in environmental quality due to the higher cost of production, whereas in equilibrium quality always improves after the introduction of the latter. We show that an optimal environmental standard is an effective regulatory instrument against greenwashing and that the efficacy of the interventions is conditioned to the damage distribution and the aggregate level of emission.
JEL: 
L13
L51
Q50
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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