Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159794
Authors: 
Delbono, Flavio
Lambertini, Luca
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 955
Abstract: 
We charaterise the socially optimal mix of firms in an oligopoly with both profit-seeking and labour-managed firms. The policy maker faces a twofold externality: (i) production entails the exploitation of a common pool natural resource and (ii) production/consumption pollutes the environment. We study the relationship between firms' mix and social welfare in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the industry and the resulting policy implications.
JEL: 
L13
H23
P13
Q50
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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