Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/159729 
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 890
Publisher: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Abstract: 
We extend Fujiwara's (2008) model to describe a differential oligopoly game of resource extraction under static, linear feedback and nonlinear feedback strategies, generalising his result that steady state feedback outputs are lower than monopoly and static oligopoly equilibrium outputs for any number of firms. Additionally, we show that (i) feedback rules entail resource exhaustion for a finite number of firms; and (ii) feedback strategies are more aggressive than static ones as long as the resource stock is large enough, in accordance with the acquired view based on the traditional pre-emption argument associated with feedback information.
JEL: 
C73
L13
Q2
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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