Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159709
Authors: 
Bacchiega, Emanuele
Bonroy, Olivier
Mabrouk, Rania
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 870
Abstract: 
In this paper we show that, in the presence of buyer and seller power, a monopolist can enter into a costly contractual relationship with a low-quality supplier with the sole intention of improving its bargaining position relative to a high-quality supplier, without ever selling the good produced by that firm.
JEL: 
L12
L13
L14
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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