Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159698
Authors: 
Lambertini, Luca
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 859
Abstract: 
I investigate two versions of a differential Cournot oligopoly game with nonrenewable resource exploitation, in which each firm may either exploit its own private pool or exploit a common pool jointly with the rivals. Firms use a deterministic technology to invest in exploration activities. In both models, there emerges that (i) the individual exploration effort is higher when each firms has exclusive rights on a pool of its own, and (ii) depending on the assumptions on technology and demand, the aggregate exploration effort is either constant or increasing in the number of firms.
JEL: 
C73
L13
Q30
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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