Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159653
Authors: 
Mantovani, Andrea
Vandekerckhove, Jan
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 814
Abstract: 
In this paper, two pairs of complementors have to decide whether to merge and eventually bundle their products. Depending on the degree of competitive pressure in the market, either both pairs decide to merge (with or without bundling), or only one pair merges and bundles, while rivals remain independent. The latter case can very harmful for consumers as it brings surge in prices. We also consider the case in which one pair moves first. Interestingly, we find a parametric region where first movers merge but refrain from bundling, to not induce rivals to merge as well.
JEL: 
D43
L13
L41
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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