Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159652
Authors: 
Lambertini, Luca
Tampieri, Alessandro
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 813
Abstract: 
We compare a Bertrand with a Cournot duopoly in a setting where production is polluting and exploits natural resources, and firms bear convex production costs. We adopt Dastidar's (1995) approach, yielding a continuum of Bertrand-Nash equilibria ranging above marginal cost pricing also, to show that softening price competition may lead to a lower output production in a Bertrand rather than a Cournot industry. The market structure bringing about the lowest output determines the highest social welfare, given the fact that the negative environmental effects of production more than offset the gain in consumer surplus.
JEL: 
L13
L41
Q51
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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