Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159607
Authors: 
Lambertini, Luca
Tampieri, Alessandro
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 768
Abstract: 
This paper examines the stability conditions of the equilibria in a market where profit-maximizing and CSR firms coexist in the presence of an environmental externality. An equilibrium in mixed duopoly is stable for low impact of productivity on pollution and high CSR sensitivity to consumer surplus. In addition, a mixed oligopoly equilibrium is stable if the number of CSR is sufficiently low.
JEL: 
H23
L13
O31
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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