Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159580
Authors: 
Giacomello, Giampiero
Lambertini, Luca
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 739
Abstract: 
We model the perspective faced by nuclear powers involved in a supergame where nuclear deterrence is used to stabilise peace. This setting allows us to investigate the bearings of defensive weapons on the effectiveness of deterrence and peace stability, relying on one-shot optimal punishments. We find that the sustainability of peace is unaffected by defensive shields if both countries have them, while a unilateral endowment of such weapons has destabilising consequences.
JEL: 
C73
F51
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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