Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159530
Authors: 
Biondi, Yuri
Giannoccolo, Pierpaolo
Reberioux, Antoine
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 689
Abstract: 
In listed companies, the Board of directors has ultimate responsibility for information disclosure. The conventional wisdom is that director independence is an essential factor in improving the quality of that disclosure. In a sense, this approach subordinates expertise to independence. We argue that effective certification may require firm-specific expertise, in particular for intangible-intensive business models. However, this latter form of expertise is negatively related to independence as it is commonly measured and evaluated. Accordingly, there exists an optimal share of independent directors for each company, related to the level of intangible resources.
JEL: 
G30
M21
D80
M41
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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