Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159522
Autor:innen: 
Dragone, Davide
Lambertini, Luca
Leitmann, George
Palestini, Arsen
Datum: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 681
Verlag: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Zusammenfassung: 
We model a dynamic monopoly with environmental externalities,investigating the adoption of a tax levied on the firm's instantaneous contribution to the accumulation of pollution. The latter process is subject to a shock, which is i.i.d. across instants. We prove the existence of an optimal tax rate such that the monopoly replicates the same steady state welfare level as under social planning. Yet, the corresponding output level, R&D investment for environmental friendly technologies and surplus distribution necessarily differ from the socially optimal ones.
JEL: 
C61
H21
H23
Q52
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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