Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159361
Authors: 
Bellettini, Giorgio
Berti Ceroni, Carlotta
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 520
Abstract: 
This paper studies the determinants of immigration policy in an economy with entrepreneurs and workers where a trade union has monopoly power over wages. The presence of the union leads a benevolent government to implement a high level of immigration and induces a welfare loss not only from an aggregate point of view, but even from the point of view of workers. In the politico-economic equilibrium where interest groups lobby for immigration, we show the condition under which workers are no longer hurt by the presence of the union.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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