Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159351
Authors: 
Baldelli, Serena
Lambertini, Luca
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 510
Abstract: 
We examine the endogenous choice between price and quantity behaviour in a duopoly supergame with product differentiation. We find that (i) if cartel profits are evenly split between firms, then only symmetric equilibria obtains; (i) if instead the additional profits available through collusion are split according to the Nash bargaining solution, there are parameter regions where all subgame perfect equilibria are asymmetric, with firms colluding in price-quantity supergames.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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