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Lambertini, Luca
Rossini, Gianpaolo
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Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 508
We reassess the respective gains from R&D cooperation and competition in a Cournot Duopoly with homogeneous goods, where firms adopt a concave cost-reducing R&D technology. Contrary to the previous literature on the same topic, our main results are that (i) no corner solutions emerge and (ii) cooperation, in the form of either a cartel or a joint venture, is always profitable for firms and (iii) socially superior to independent ventures, provided that spillovers are sufficiently high.
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