Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159341
Authors: 
Barigozzi, Francesca
Villeneuve, Bertrand
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 500
Abstract: 
The paper focuses on the signaling value of a tax when agents are less informed on the effect of their consumption than the policy-maker. When he chooses the tax, the policy-maker optimizes both the incentive effect and the effect on beliefs. We show that optimal taxes under symmetric information are not implementable under asymmetric information. The tax distortion required for credibility depends on the marginal cost of public funds and brings to undertaxation.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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