Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/159333 
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 492
Publisher: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Abstract: 
We analyse a model of vertical differentiation focusing on the trade-off between entering early and exploiting monopoly power with a low quality, versus waiting and enjoying a dominant market position with a superior product. We show that there exists a unique equilibrium where the leader enters with a lower quality than the follower, for low discount factors, for high costs of quality and for low consumers' willingness to pay for quality.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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