Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159301
Authors: 
Lambertini, Luca
Rovelli, Riccardo
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 460
Abstract: 
We study a model where monetary and fiscal policy share the task of stabilizing output and inflation, and the central bank has been assigned a mandate for the latter. The optimal fiscal policy does not imply assigning to the government a (symmetric) mandate to stabilize output. Instead, the optimal response to the aggregate demnd and supply shocks may be characterized as equivalent to an automatic stabilizer. An alternative but equivalent characterization of fiscal policy is that the government should maximize a "model" social welfarefunction, respectively over (under) weighting the objective of price stability versus output stability when the relative size of aggregate demand vs supply shocks is large (small). This over (under) weighting of the two objectives is only apparent , as it is in fact the logical consequence of having defind the mandate of the central bank in terms of one objective only.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
208.1 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.