Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159277
Authors: 
Alvisi, Matteo
Argentesi, Elena
Carbonara, Emanuela
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 436
Abstract: 
We study the impact of piracy on the quality choices of a monopolist. In the absence of piracy, the monopolist has no incentive to differentiate its products. With piracy the monopolist might instead produce more than one quality, so that differentiation arises as the optimal strategy. This is because the producer wants to divert consumers from the pirated good to the original one. Differentiation involves either producing a new, low-quality good such that piracy is either eliminated or still observed in equilibrium.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
209.65 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.