Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159257
Authors: 
Mantovani, Andrea
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 416
Abstract: 
In this paper I will evaluate the strategic behavior of two firms which can activate R&D investments either to process or to product innovation. I will consider a particular kind of process R&D activity, which I will call Transport and Communication R&D and which aims at increasing the net amount of the product that reaches consumers. I will limit my study to a Cournot duopoly setting. The strategic interaction will be therefre axpressed in terms of a two-stage three strategy game, where firms first decide whether to invest in one of the two types of R&D and then they compete in the market by setting quantities. As a result, I will obtain both symmetric and asymmetric equilibria, depending on the relative efficiency of the R&D effert.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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