Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/159226 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2000
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 385
Verlag: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Zusammenfassung: 
We describe a vertically di¤erentiated market where firms choose between activating either independent ventures leading to distinct product qualities, or a joint venture for a single quality. Then, firms either repeat the one-shot Nash equilibrium forever, or behave collusively, according to discount factors. We prove that there exists a parameter region where the joint venture makes it more difficult for firms to sustain collusive behaviour, as compared to independent ventures. Therefore, public policies towards R&D behaviour should be designed so as not to become inconsistent with the pro-competitive attitude characterising the current legislation on marketing practices.
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