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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2000
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 371
Verlag: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyse both the theoretical and empirical side of the issue of R&D spillover. Each firm`s R&D costs are increasing in the amount of the information transmitted to the other firms , and we account for the possibility that the firms control spillovers. We consider both Cournot-Nash and Cornot-Stackelberg behavior. The empirical analyst suggests that (i) firms` control on spillovers is relatively low; (ii) the cost-saving effect associated to joint ventures or R&D cartels is confermed for industries where firms rely mainly upon own R&D as a source of innovation; (iii) R&D cooperation may increase informationsharing, thereby enhancing spillovers.
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