Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159162
Authors: 
Lambertini, Luca
Rossini, Giampaolo
Year of Publication: 
1998
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 320
Abstract: 
We model a symmetric duopoly where firms choose whether to be quantity setters or price setters by deciding the optimal capacity; undertake R&D activity to determine the degree of differentiation; and finally compete in the market. Two games are proposed, where investment decisions follow different sequences. We assess price and quantity decisions, finding a set of equilibria where the choice of the market variable is affected by both technological commitments. As a result, the acquired wisdom that quantity setting is a dominant strategy for firms, while price setting is a dominant strategy from a social standpoint, may not be confirmed.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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