Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159110
Authors: 
Lambertini, Luca
Year of Publication: 
1996
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 267
Abstract: 
Which shape market competition is likely to exhibit? This question is addressed in the present paper, where firms can choose whether to act as quantity or price setters, whether to move early or delay as long as possible at the market stage and finally whether to be entrepreneurial or managerial. Moreover, firms can endogenously determine the sequence of such decisions. It is shown that in correspondence of the (unique) subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, all firms first decide to delay, then to act as Cournot competitors, and finally stockholders decide to delegate control to managers. Hence, sequential play between either managerial or entrepreneurial firms, as well as simultaneous play between entrepreneurial firms are ruled out.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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