Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/159085 
Year of Publication: 
1996
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 242
Publisher: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Abstract: 
We show that any social choice function that always selects envy-free Pareto efficient allocations must violate Arrow's condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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