Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159016
Authors: 
Lambertini, Luca
Year of Publication: 
1993
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 173
Abstract: 
The effects of the delegation of control to managers are investigated in a duopolistic market for differentiated goods. It appears that delegation is profitable to shareholders under Cournot competiton, provided that the rival firm maximizes profit.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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