Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/159016 
Year of Publication: 
1993
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 173
Publisher: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Abstract: 
The effects of the delegation of control to managers are investigated in a duopolistic market for differentiated goods. It appears that delegation is profitable to shareholders under Cournot competiton, provided that the rival firm maximizes profit.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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