Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/158951
Authors: 
Delbono, Flavio
Denicolò, Vincenzo
Scarpa, Carlo
Year of Publication: 
1991
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 108
Abstract: 
We model a duopoly with a private and a public firm under the hypothesis of vertical product differentiation. Firms choose their quality levels first and then prices. We ask which firm will choose to serve the higher (lower) segment of the market. When firms act simultaneously in each stage, there are two subgame perfect Nash equilibria entailing opposite rankings between the quality levels. If the State-owned firm has a move advantage, then there is a unique Stackelberg equilibrium in which the public firm serves the upper segment of the market.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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