Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/158891
Authors: 
Delbono, Flavio
Denicolò, Vincenzo
Year of Publication: 
1988
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 48
Abstract: 
Since the work of Schumpeter, it has been argued that there may exist a trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency. As a contribution to this debate, in this paper we compare the R&D performance of CCournot and Bertrand oligopolists. We model a one-shot noncooperative game in which firms invest in R&D, with the aim of being first in a competition for a patentable cost-reducing innovation.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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